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Abstract—In the standard Mechanism Design framework,
agents’ messages are gathered at a central point and alloca-
tion/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as
functions of all network agents’ messages. This requirement may
cause communication and computation overhead and necessitates
the design of mechanisms that alleviate this bottleneck.
We consider a scenario where message transmission can
only be performed locally so that the mechanism allocation/tax
functions can be calculated in a decentralized manner. Each agent
transmits messages to her local neighborhood, as defined by a
given message-exchange network, and her allocation/tax functions
are only functions of the available neighborhood messages. This
scenario gives rise to a novel research problem that we call
“Distributed Mechanism Design”.
In this paper, we propose two distributed mechanisms for
network utility maximization problems that involve private and
public goods with competition and cooperation between agents.
As a concrete example, we use the problems of rate allocation in
networks with either unicast or multirate multicast transmission
protocols. The proposed mechanism for each of the protocols
fully implements the optimal allocation in Nash equilibria and
its message space dimensionality scales linearly with respect to
the number of agents in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Allocation of scarce resources in networks has been a topic
of intensive research in the last fifty years. This problem is
often formulated as a network utility maximization (NUM)
problem [3, Ch. 2] where the designer is seeking the optimal
allocation of resources that maximizes the social welfare. The
complexity of this problem, especially for large networks of
heterogeneous and strategic agents with privacy constraints
stems from the fact that agents may not be willing to share
some of their private information related to their utilities.
Hence, appropriate incentives (taxes/subsidies) have to be
put in place to incentivize agents to reveal some part of
their private information relevant to the welfare optimization
problem. A useful mathematical framework for this setting
is mechanism design (MD) [4], [5] that has been widely
utilized in such areas of research as market allocations [6]–[8],
rate and resource allocations [3, Sec. 2.7] [9]–[13], spectrum
sharing [14]–[16], data security [17], power allocation in
wireless networks [18], [19], demand-side management in the
power grid [20]–[22], etc.
In the standard MD framework (Hurwicz-Reiter [4]) agents
are transmitting messages to a central authority. The central
authority, upon receiving all these messages, determines al-
location and taxes/subsidies for the agents of the network.
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Equivalently, all agents broadcast their messages to everyone
else and then the allocation and taxes can be generated (and
verified) by everyone in the network. Clearly, this arrange-
ment results in a significant communication overhead due to
message transmission of agents to the central authority or to
each other, and this problem becomes more pronounced the
larger the network. The motivation for this work is the more
realistic scenario where such message transmission to a central
authority (or equivalently, broadcasting of messages) cannot
take place due to network communication constraints. To
investigate this problem, we consider a setting in which agents
are only allowed to transmit their messages to their neighbor-
ing agents. In this setting, neighborhoods are defined through
an underlying message-exchange network. Consequently, each
agent can determine her allocation and tax based on the
messages she hears locally and therefore, there is no need for
a central authority to evaluate these functions. This implies
that, unlike standard mechanisms, the designed allocation
and tax functions cannot have the whole message space as
their domain; rather the allocation and tax function for each
agent should only depend on the neighborhood messages. This
additional restriction gives rise to a novel research direction
that we call “Distributed Mechanism Design” (DMD).
A complementary view of DMD stems from the literature
of distributed optimization (e.g., [23]–[29]). In distributed
optimization agents do exchange local messages in order to
solve a centralized allocation problem. It is assumed however,
that agents are not strategic–in fact they are automata–and
follow a predefined message exchange algorithm. DMD can
be thought of as the generalization of distributed optimization
to account for strategic agents, i.e., for settings where we can
no longer assume that agents will follow a distributed message
passing algorithm unless the designer puts in place appropriate
incentives for them to do so.
In this paper we consider two network resource allocation
problems with increasing degree of sophistication, formulated
as NUM problems. Although the models presented are ab-
stract, we present them through two concrete applications. In
particular, we consider rate allocation for data transmission on
a network which operates either with a unicast transmission
protocol (UTP) or a multirate multicast transmission protocol
(MMTP). For each of these protocols, a distributed mecha-
nism is proposed for efficient rate allocation. The distributed
mechanism proposed for MMTP is an extended and modified
version of the distributed mechanism for UTP. For this reason,
we present these two mechanisms side-by-side and highlight
the main techniques used and the differences between them
throughout the presentation.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. Both of
the proposed mechanisms are (a) distributed, (b) they fully
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implement the optimal allocation in Nash equilibria (NE)
(i.e., there are no extraneous non-efficient equilibria in the
induced game), and (c) their total message space dimension
grows linearly with respect to the number of network agents.
Furthermore, the mechanisms are (d) individually rational and
(e) weak budget balanced at NE.
A. Relevant Literature
A non-distributed mechanism for efficient rate allocation
with UTP has been proposed in [10], [12], [30] and with
MMTP in [11], [13]. In this paper the models we consider
closely follow the models in these works but the mechanisms
differ in a fundamental way since our focus is designing
distributed mechanisms. The current work builds on distributed
mechanisms for Walrasian and Lindahl allocation in private
and public goods, respectively, that were proposed in [31]
[32, Ch. 4]. We have utilized an idea similar to the radial
allocation [8], [9], [13] to achieve feasibility at NE. Unlike the
mechanism in [31] with message dimensionality per user that
grows linearly with the number of users in the whole network,
in this work, the message dimensionality of each agent grows
linearly only with respect to the size of her neighborhood.
There is a line of research in the computer science liter-
ature by the name distributed algorithmic mechanism design
(DAMD) [33]–[35] [36, Ch. 14]. We caution the reader not
to confuse DAMD with DMD. The mechanisms in DAMD
impose no restrictions on the domain of the allocation and
tax functions. Indeed these functions can depend on the
entire message from all users. The “distributed” aspect of
DAMD pertains to the fact that an algorithm is designated
to collect and disseminate all these messages to the users
of the network so that they can all evaluate these complex
functions. In DMD however, the allocation and tax functions
are explicitly designed so that they only depend on messages
from neighboring agents. Another difference is that in DAMD
the message exchange network coincides with the network
implied by the allocation problem (e.g., in [33] messages are
exchanged between neighboring agents on the multicast tree)
while in DMD, as will be evident in Section II, the message
exchange network can be arbitrary.
A related line of work in distributed optimization attempts
to resolve “privacy” issues by means of dithering (i.e., adding
noise to) the exchanged messages or the objective function as
in [37]–[40]. In these works, agents are given some privacy
guarantees in that the distributed algorithm does not fully
reveal their private information. However, the agents are still
considered non-strategic automata, i.e., it is assumed that they
follow the prescription of the algorithm even if there is an
incentive to deviate.
We conclude the discussion on the relevant literature by
pointing out that the games induced by DMD fall under the
class of “graphical games” [41], [42]. This property may have
some consequences on the complexity of off-line evaluation
of the NE, which however, is not of importance in our work.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
the model and problem formulation for both of the network
transmission protocols are discussed. Section III presents both
of the distributed mechanisms by characterizing the message-
exchange network and defining messages, allocation and tax
functions. A specific example is discussed in detail in Sec-
tion IV in order to clarify the general definitions of the
distributed algorithms. In Section V, the properties of the
designed mechanisms are derived and the main results are
presented. In Section VI, for each of the two mechanisms, an
alternative mechanism is presented by relaxing an assumption
on the message-exchange network. We conclude and comment
on the message dimensions in Section VII. All of the proofs of
intermediate lemmas can be found in the Appendix and also
at an extended version of this paper [43].
II. MODEL
The two abstract centralized optimization problems for
which distributed mechanisms will be developed in the follow-
ing sections are precisely defined in (1) and (3), respectively.
In order to make the discussion more relevant to resource
allocation in data transmission networks, we now present
two concrete applications that will serve as prototypes in the
subsequent discussion. In particular, we consider a data trans-
mission network with two different transmission protocols,
Unicast Transmission Protocol (UTP) and Multirate Multicast
Transmission Protocol (MMTP) and for each one of them
an optimization problem for efficient data rate allocation is
presented. We are following closely the models developed
in [3, Sec. 2.7] [10]–[13]. The network consists of multiple
sources in the set K = {1, ...,K} and strategic receivers in
the set N = {1, ..., N}, which will be referred to as agents.
Each agent has one designated source from which it receives
content, and each source can send content to multiple agents
possibly with different data rates. The vector of allocated
rates to all agents is denoted by x = (x1, ..., xN ) ∈ RN+ ,
where xi is the data rate of agent i. Based on its allocated
rate, xi, each agent receives a private utility (satisfaction)
vi(xi). The following assumptions are imposed on the utility
functions. For every i ∈ N , vi(·) ∈ V0, where V0 is the set of
strictly concave, monotonically increasing, twice differentiable
R+ → R functions with continuous second derivatives. The
valuation function vi(.) is the private information of agent
i. The network links are denoted by L = {1, ..., L}, each
of which has capacity cl > 0. Agent i’s data stream is
transmitted via links Li ⊂ L with |Li| = Li. The routing
has been established in advance and it is considered fixed for
the problem of interest in this paper. For each link l, agents
using it are denoted by N l with |N l| = N l. The designer’s
goal is to maximize the social welfare which is the summation
of agents’ valuation functions. This is done by determining the
efficient x that is consistent with the capacity constraints of the
network which arise from the specific transmission protocol
utilized. In the following, we provide more concrete details
for UTP and MMTP models.
A. Unicast Transmission Protocol (UTP)
In UTP, a separate data stream is established between
each source-receiver pair, regardless of whether the same data
content is transmitted multiple times over some links. An
example of a network utilizing UTP is depicted in Fig. 1.
We assume N l ≥ 2, that is at least two agents use any link
R1
R2
R3
R4
T1
T2
x1+x2
x3+x4
x1
x2+x3+x4
x2
x3
x4
A B
Fig. 1: Network with Unicast Transmission Protocol (UTP).
Both R1 and R2 use link T1-A, which, due to using UTP, is
loaded with the sum data rate x1 + x2.
l. This mild assumption is made so that there is competition
between agents for using any of the links and it will help us
avoid corner cases that distract from the main message of the
paper.
The centralized optimization problem that formulates the
design goal for UTP is as follows
max
x
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (1a)
s.t. xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (1b)
and
∑
j∈N l
xj ≤ cl ∀l ∈ L. (1c)
In order to characterize the solution of problem (1), we use
dual variables λ = {λl, l ∈ L} and write the KKT conditions
for this problem. Since the valuation functions are concave
and all of the constraints of problem (1) are affine, problem
(1) is a convex optimization problem and so KKT conditions
are necessary and sufficient. These conditions at the optimal
point (x∗, λ∗) are
(a) Primal Feasibility: x∗ satisfies (1b) and (1c).
(b) Dual Feasibility: λl∗ ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L.
(c) Complimentary Slackness:
λl∗(cl −
∑
j∈N l
x∗j ) = 0 ∀l ∈ L. (2a)
(d) Stationarity:
v′i(x
∗
i ) =
∑
l∈Li
λl∗ if x∗i > 0 (2b)
v′i(x
∗
i ) ≤
∑
l∈Li
λl∗ if x∗i = 0. (2c)
B. Multirate Multicast Transmission Protocol (MMTP)
In MMTP model, agents are classified into K groups
based on their data source and each group is denoted by
Gk ⊂ N . Since agents in each group receive data from the
same source (albeit with possibly different data rates), instead
of transmitting a separate data stream to each agent, in each
link only a single stream is transmitted for each group utilizing
that link. Furthermore, the data rate of that stream is the
maximum demanded rate among users in the group on that
link. In other words, each source transmits the common data
of agents by the best quality demanded in each link and each
agent can regenerate her own data by down-sampling from the
received data stream to get her desirable quality. This scenario
is as if agents inside a group share the bandwidth with each
other (public good) but they have competition for it with other
groups (private good), a situation referred to as intergroup
competition and intragroup sharing in [13]. An example of
a network utilizing MMTP is illustrated in Fig. 2. We further
R1
R2
R3
R4
T1
T2
max{x1,x2}
max{x3,x4}
x1
x2 + max{x3,x4}
x2
x3
x4
A B
Fig. 2: Network with Multirate Multicast Transmission Pro-
tocol (MMTP). Even though both R1 and R2 use link T1-A,
due to using MMTP, it is only loaded with the maximum rate
max{x1, x2}.
define the following quantities. The group of agent i is denoted
by k(i). The set of users in group k using link l is denoted
by Glk = N l ∩Gk. Further, Kl is the subset of groups that are
using link l (groups that contain at least one agent using link
l) with |Kl| = Kl. For the same reason as in UTP, we assume
Kl ≥ 2, that is, at least two groups use each link l and this
is for ensuring competition at each link.
The centralized optimization problem that formulates the
design goal for MMTP is as follows
max
x
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (3a)
s.t. xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (3b)
and
∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{xi} ≤ cl ∀l ∈ L. (3c)
As in the case of UTP, we utilize KKT conditions to
characterize the solution of problem (3). We first need to
transform it into a convex optimization problem. Towards this
goal, we introduce the variable blk for each l ∈ L and k ∈ Kl
that represents the maximum demanded rate of agents in group
k that use link l, which we refer to as the “group rate”. It is
straightforward to show the equivalence of problem (3) with
the one below
max
x
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (4a)
s.t. xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (4b)
and
∑
k∈Kl
blk ≤ cl ∀l ∈ L (4c)
and xi ≤ blk ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ Kl, i ∈ Glk. (4d)
Similar to problem (1), problem (4) is a convex optimization
problem and hence, KKT conditions are necessary and suffi-
cient for its solution. We use dual variables λ = {λl, l ∈ L},
each of which corresponds to one of the constraints in (4c) and
µ = {µli,∀l ∈ L, i ∈ N l}, each of which corresponds to one
of the constraints in (4d). We can write the KKT conditions
at the optimal point (x∗, b∗, λ∗, µ∗) as
(a) Primal Feasibility: x∗ and b∗ satisfy (4b) and (4c) and
(4d).
(b) Dual Feasibility: λl∗ ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L and µl∗i ≥ 0 ∀l ∈
L, i ∈ N l.
(c) Complimentary Slackness:
λl∗(cl −
∑
k∈Kl
bl∗k ) = 0 ∀l ∈ L (5a)
µl∗i (x
∗
i − bl∗k ) = 0 ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ Kl, i ∈ Glk. (5b)
(d) Stationarity:
v′i(x
∗
i ) =
∑
l∈Li
µl∗i ∀i ∈ N if x∗i > 0 (5c)
v′i(x
∗
i ) ≤
∑
l∈Li
µl∗i ∀i ∈ N if x∗i = 0 (5d)
λl∗ =
∑
i∈Glk
µl∗i ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ Kl. (5e)
Note that from the above KKT conditions it is obvious
that MMTP gives rise to the “free-riding” problem that is
commonly encountered in public-goods problems [44, Sec.
11.C]: if an agent i on link l is not requesting the highest rate
among the agents in the same group k(i), then his contribution
µl∗i is zero in the “price” λ
l∗ for this link and thus she can free-
ride on the other agent(s) in the group requesting the highest
rate.
The optimization problems (1) and (4) cannot be solved
in a centralized manner because the valuation functions of
agents are private information of the agents. In the next
section, we present two distributed mechanisms that aim to
reach the solution of optimization problems (1) and (4) in a
decentralized fashion in the presence of strategic agents.
III. DISTRIBUTED MECHANISM
A mechanism consists of a message space Mi for each
agent i ∈ N giving rise to a total message space M =
M1 × . . . ,×MN , and allocation and tax functions that are
denoted by xˆi : M → RN+ and tˆi : M → RN , respectively.
Hence, a mechanism can be characterized completely by
specifying the tuple (M, (xˆi)i∈N , (tˆi)i∈N ). The mechanism
induces the game G = (N ,M, (uˆi)i∈N ), where we consider
a quasi-linear environment with uˆi(m) = vi(xˆi(m)) − tˆi(m)
for any m ∈ M. In the following we will use superscripts u
and m to specify quantities for UTP and MMTP, respectively.
Thus, we will use notationsMu, xˆui , tˆui , mu, Gu, uˆui for UTP,
and similarly, Mm, xˆmi , tˆmi , mm, Gm, uˆmi for MMTP. In the
following we formally describe “distributed” mechanisms, i.e.,
mechanisms for which the allocation and tax functions depend
only on neighboring agents’ messages as opposed to the entire
message space M.
A. Message-Exchange Network
We describe the local exchange of messages through a
“message-exchange network”, which is modeled as an undi-
rected acyclic (tree) connected graph GR = (N , E), in which
agents are denoted by nodes and an edge between two agents
indicates that these two agents receive each others’ messages.
For all i ∈ N , N (i) is the set of neighbors of agent i in GR
and |N (i)| = N(i). Further, n(i, j) is agent i’s neighbor which
is on the shortest path from i to j. Also, N l(i) = N (i) ∩N l
and |N l(i)| = N l(i). For each agent i ∈ N , the function φ(i)
arbitrarily chooses one of agent i’s neighbors. We define the
set Ii = {h ∈ N (i) : φ(h) = i}. The role of this function
will become evident in the description of the allocation and
tax functions.
Notice that the “message-exchange network” is not to be
confused with the “data transmission network” related to UTP
and MMTP and modeled through the centralized problems in
(1) or (3). The former enables the decentralized solution of
those problems by means of exchanging messages between
neighboring nodes, while the latter describes the relation
between agents dictated by the common links utilized by their
data flows. These two neworks are illustrated in Fig. 3.
Agent 3
Agent 2
Agent 1
Agent 4
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Source 1
Source 2
Message-exchange 
Network
Data 
Transmission 
Network
Fig. 3: Message-exchange network vs. Data transmission net-
work
In the following, we state two assumptions for the message-
exchange network where Assumption 1 holds for both UTP
and MMTP mechanisms and Assumption 2 only holds for
MMTP mechanism. These assumptions simplify the exposition
of the mechanisms. We will further relax Assumption 1 for
both mechanisms in Section VI and two alternative mecha-
nisms will be proposed.
Assumption 1: (UTP/MMTP) For each link l ∈ L, the sub-
graph consisting of agents i ∈ N l is a connected graph.
This assumption essentially requires that a connected path
exists for message passing between agents using the same link,
eventually enabling them to form a consensus about some of
the exchanged messages, e.g., the price for using each link.
Assumption 2: (MMTP) For each link l ∈ L and group
k ∈ Kl, there is at least one node i ∈ Glk that is connected
to all other nodes j ∈ Glk in a single hop. This node will be
referred to as the “group leader” of group k in link l and will
be denoted by c(k, l).
For each agent i ∈ N , the set Ci is defined as the set of
links l for which c(k(i), l) = i, i.e., this set contains all links
for which agent i is a group leader.
The reason for this assumption is that in MMTP due to the
free-riding problem, we require that there exists a user in each
group Glk who has access to some necessary information about
her group (e.g., group demand, group price) and can announce
this information to the rest of the agents in Glk.
B. Message Components
1) UTP: Agent i announces the message mui =
(yi, ni, qi, pi). The first message yi ∈ R+ is a proxy for
her demanded rate. The second message, ni = (nli,j , j ∈
N (i), l ∈ L) ∈ RL×N(i)+ consists of components nli,j , which
are referred to as “summary” messages, each of which is a
proxy for the sum of demands of the agents h ∈ N l with
n(i, h) = j. In other words, nli,j is the sum of demanded rates
for all users that are connected to i through her neighbor j.
These messages are required by agent i in order to assess the
total demand on each link she is using. The third message,
qi = (qi,j , j ∈ Ii) ∈ R|Ii|+ is a vector of components qi,j ,
each of which is a proxy for the demand of neighboring agent
j ∈ Ii. The purpose of these messages will become evident in
the allocation function (7) and can intuitively be explained
as follows: in order to allocate rate to agent i in such a
way that the capacity constraint at each link is satisfied, her
demanded rate needs to be scaled by the sum of rates in that
link. However, in evaluating the sum of rates, the rate of agent
i should not be controlled by her; instead an arbitrarily chosen
neighboring agent j quotes her rate through the message qj,i.
Clearly, we want the message qj,i to agree with yi at NE.
Finally, the message pi = (pli, l ∈ Li) ∈ RLi+ is the price (per
unit of rate) that agent i suggests for using each link l. This
message is essentially a proxy for the dual variable λl∗ that
appears in the KKT conditions (2).
The message components for UTP are summarized in
Table I.
TABLE I: Message components of agent i ∈ N in UTP
mechanism
Message
Component Definition Functionality
yi - Demand for the data rate
nli,j
j ∈ N (i)
l ∈ L
Summary for demands of agents
on link l, connected to i via j
qi,j j ∈ Ii Proxy for yj
pli l ∈ Li Suggested price for using link l
2) MMTP: Agent i announces the message mmi =
(yi, ni, qi, pi, si, wi, zi, ai). The reason for the larger message
compared to UTP stems form the fact that (a) all agents
within a group Glk need access to the maximum demanded
rate in that group (this is required due to the free-riding
problem that is inherent in the MMTP scenario) and (b) this
information needs to be disseminated to all agents in the
network while satisfying the communication constraints. In
the following we give intuitive explanations for the meaning
of each of the eight message components. The first message
yi ∈ R+ is a proxy for the agent i’s demanded rate. The
second message, ni = (nli,j , j ∈ N (i), l ∈ L) ∈ RL×N(i)+
consists of components nli,j where, similar to UTP, are referred
to as “summary” messages, with the only difference being that
each of them is a proxy for the sum of group demands (not
individual demands) of the agents h ∈ N l with n(i, h) = j.
The third message, qi = (qi,j , j ∈ Ii) ∈ R|Ii|+ consists of
elements qi,j , each of which is a proxy for agent j’s demand,
and its role is similar to UTP. The fourth message consists
of two components pi = (p1i , p
2
i ). The first component is
defined as p1i = (p
1,l
i , l ∈ Li) ∈ RLi+ , where each variable
p1,li is the price that agent i is willing to pay for using
link l and is similar to the message pli in UTP. This is
essentially a proxy for the dual variable µl∗i that appears in
the KKT conditions (5). The second component is defined
as p2i = (p
2,l
i,j , j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj) ∈ R
(
∑
j∈Ii Lj)
+ , where each
variable p2,li,j is the price that agent i thinks agent j should
pay for using link l ∈ Lj . The reason why user i quotes
a price relevant to user j is the same as in the case of the q
messages explained above in the UTP scenario. We now define
the new messages that are present in MMTP and give intuitive
explanations for their role. The fifth message is defined as
si = (s
l
i, l ∈ Li) ∈ RLi+ , where, each of the variables sli is
capturing whether the specific agent belongs in the group of
agents that demand the maximum rate within the group Glk(i).
We call these messages as proxies of the “group demand”.
Specifically, at NE, the message sli becomes zero if agent
i is not in the max group in link l, and otherwise, it will
be the maximum demanded rate of group Glk(i) divided by
the number of users in the max group in link l. The sixth
message wi = (wli, l ∈ Li) ∈ RLi+ consists of components
wli, each of which is a proxy for the price that group k(i) is
willing to pay for link l and will be refered to as group price
of group k(i) for link l. These messages have to converge
at NE to the dual variables λl∗ in the KKT conditions (5)
for all users i ∈ N l. The seventh message is defined as
zi = (z
1
i , z
2
i ). The first component z
1
i = (z
1,l
i , l ∈ Ci) ∈ R|Ci|+
consists of elements z1,li , each of which is a proxy for the
maximum value of demands of agents in Glk(i), i.e., the
total group demand of agents in the group Glk(i). Further,
z2i = (z
2,l
i , l ∈ Ci) ∈ R|Ci|+ consists of elements z2,li , each of
which is a proxy for the number of agents that have maximum
demand in Glk(i). These messages are quoted by user i for
every link for which i is the group leader of Glk(i). Finally, the
eighth message, ai = (a1i , a
2
i ), consists of two components.
The first component is defined as a1i = (a
1,l
i , l ∈ Li) ∈ RLi++.
Its role is quite technical and will become evident in the
proof of efficiency of the NE of this mechanism. The second
component, a2i = (a
2,l
i,j , j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj) ∈ R
(
∑
j∈Ii Lj)
++ ,
consists of the elements a2,li,j , each of which is a proxy for
the message a1,lj . The reason for user i quoting such message
relevant to user j is the same as in the case of q messages
explained earlier in the UTP scenario.
The message components for MMTP are summarized in
Table II.
TABLE II: Message components of agent i ∈ N in MMTP
mechanism
Message
Component Definition Functionality
yi - Demand for the data rate
nli,j
j ∈ N (i)
l ∈ L
Summary for group demands
of agents on link l and
connected to i via j
qi,j j ∈ Ii Proxy for yj
p1,li l ∈ Li Suggested price for using link l
p2,li,j
j ∈ Ii
l ∈ Lj Proxy for p
1,l
j
sli l ∈ Li
Proxy for group demand
on link l and group k(i)
wli l ∈ Li
Proxy for group price
of group k(i) for link l
z1,li l ∈ Ci
Proxy for the total group
demand on link l and group k(i)
z2,li l ∈ Ci
Proxy for the number
of agents with max demand
on link l and group k(i)
a1,li l ∈ Li Technical point in the proof
a2,li,j
j ∈ Ii
l ∈ Lj Proxy for a
1,l
j
C. Allocation Functions
Let us first define some auxiliary variables. For the UTP
scenario, for each agent i ∈ N and for every l ∈ L, yli is
defined as yli = 1Li(l)yi, where 1A is the indicator function
of the set A. Similarly, for the MMTP scenario, we define yli
as yli = 1Li(l)sli. Further, for each agent i ∈ N and l ∈ Li,
the auxiliary quantities z¯1,li and z¯
2,l
i are defined as
z¯1,li =
{
max{qφ(i),i,maxj∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i{yj}} if l ∈ Ci
z1,lc(k(i),l) if l /∈ Ci
(6a)
z¯2,li =
{
1{qφ(i),i}(z¯
1,l
i ) +
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i 1{yj}(z¯
1,l
i ) if l ∈ Ci
z2,lc(k(i),l) if l /∈ Ci.
(6b)
The meaning of these quantities is as follows. The quantity
z¯1,li encodes the maximum demanded rate in the group Glk(i). If
user i is not the leader of that group, then the leader c(k(i), l)
quotes this message through z1,lc(k(i),l). On the other hand, if i is
the leader of the group then she has to compute the maximum
demand from all other members of the group including her
own demand which is now quoted by a proxy through qφ(i),i.
Similarly, the quantity z¯2,li encodes the number of agents with
maximum demand among all of the agents in the group Glk(i).
We utilize an idea similar to the radial allocation [13]
to have feasible allocation at NE. With this goal in mind,
for message vectors mui = (yi, ni, qi, pi) and m
m
i =
(yi, ni, qi, pi, si, wi, zi, ai), the allocation functions for the two
mechanisms are defined as appropriately scaled versions of the
demanded rates as follows
xˆui (m
u) = rui yi xˆ
m
i (m
m) = rmi yi, (7a)
where rui and r
m
i are agent i’s radial allocation factor in the
two protocols and they are defined as
rui = min
l∈L
cl
fu,li
rmi = min
l∈L
cl
fm,li
, (7b)
where for l ∈ Li, fu,li and fm,li are defined as
fu,li = qφ(i),i +
∑
j∈N (i)
(ylj +
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nlj,h) (7c)
fm,li =
qφ(i),i1{qφ(i),i}(z¯
1,l
i )
z¯2,li
+
∑
j∈N (i)
(ylj +
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nlj,h),
(7d)
and for l /∈ Li,
fu,li = f
m,l
i =
∑
j∈N (i)
(ylj +
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nlj,h). (7e)
The role of the messages n and q should now be clear from the
above description. The quantity fu,li is the total demanded rate
on link l by all agents (from agent i’s viewpoint). However,
since agent i does not have access to other agents’ demands
outside her neighborhood, utilizes the summary messages nj ,
j ∈ N (i) for this purpose. In addition, her own demand
is quoted by a pre-specified neighboring agent φ(i) through
qφ(i),i. This is done so that the quantities f
u,l
i and f
m,l
i do
not depend on agent i’s messages and the only part that agent
i can control in her allocation is yi in (7a). This choice will
greatly simplify our proofs of efficiency of the mechanisms.
The additional complication in (7d) is due to the fact that
in MMTP, if there are more than one agents who quote
the maximum rate in a group, they should only load the
corresponding link by that maximum rate and not the sum
of the maximum rates, thus the normalization by z¯2,li . This is
exactly the reason for the introduction of the z messages in
MMTP mechanism.
D. Tax Functions
1) UTP: The tax function is tˆui (m
u) =
∑
l∈L tˆ
u,l
i (m
u) and
for each component tˆu,li (m
u) we have different cases.
For l ∈ Li we have
tˆu,li (m
u) =p¯l−ixˆ
u
i (m
u)
+
∑
j∈N (i)
(nli,j − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nlj,h)
2
+
∑
j∈Ii
(qi,j − yj)2 + (pli − p¯l−i)2
+ (pli − p¯l−i)p¯l−i(cl − rui fu,li )2, (8a)
where p¯l−i is the average price for link l quoted by the
neighbors of i and is defined as
p¯l−i =
1
N l(i)
∑
j∈N l(i)
plj . (8b)
For l /∈ Li we have
tˆu,li (m
u) =
∑
j∈N (i)
(nli,j − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nlj,h)
2. (8c)
Intuitively, the tax functions provide some penalties to
incentivize agents for quoting messages in a desirable way.
With this goal in mind, taxes contain three types of terms.
The first type is a rate times price component (first term
in (8a)). Since agent i controls her allocation through yi we
do not allow her to control her price as well and so the price
that she pays is dictated by her neighbors through p¯l−i. The
second type consists of quadratic terms that at NE will become
zero and thus can be thought of as incentivizing agents to
come to a consensus (second to fourth terms in (8a)). This
enables the mechanism to provide proxies for the missing
information of agents at NE, in addition to the requirements
of having efficient allocation at NE. The third type relates
to the complimentary slackness conditions in (2) (fifth term
in (8a)). The reason of defining two different tax functions is
that different incentives are required for agents that utilize a
link versus ones that do not. For instance, each agent i has to
pay a tax even for links l /∈ Li, which is required for consensus
about the “summary messages”. The intuition about each tax
term will become more evident from the results in the lemmas
of Section V.
2) MMTP: The tax function is defined as tˆmi (m
m) =
tˆm,ci (m
m)+
∑
l∈L tˆ
m,l
i (m
m), where the first term is defined as
tˆm,ci (m
m) =
∑
j∈Ii
∑
l∈Lj
((p2,li,j − p1,lj )2 + (a2,li,j − a1,lj )2)
+
∑
j∈Ii
(qi,j − yj)2, (9a)
and for each component tˆm,li (m
m), we consider different cases.
For l ∈ Li, l /∈ Ci, we have
tˆm,li (m
m) = p2,lφ(i),ixˆ
m
i (m
m) +
∑
j∈N (i)
(nli,j − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nlj,h)
2
+ (sli−
qφ(i),i1{qφ(i),i}(z¯
1,l
i )
z¯2,li
)2+ w¯l−i(wˆ
l
i − w¯l−i)(cl− rmi fm,li )2
+ (wˆli − w¯l−i)2 + p2,lφ(i),i(p1,li − p2,lφ(i),i)(z¯1,li − qφ(i),i)2
+ (wli − wlc(k(i),l))2. (9b)
For l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci, we have
tˆm,li (m
m) = p2,lφ(i),ixˆ
m
i (m
m) +
∑
j∈N (i)
(nli,j − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nlj,h)
2
+ (sli −
qφ(i),i1{qφ(i),i}(z¯
1,l
i )
z¯2,li
)2 + (z1,li − z¯1,li )2 + (z2,li − z¯2,li )2
+ w¯l−i(wˆ
l
i − w¯l−i)(cl − rmi fm,li )2 + (wˆli − w¯l−i)2
+ p2,lφ(i),i(p
1,l
i − p2,lφ(i),i)(z¯1,li − qφ(i),i)2
+ (wli − p2,lφ(i),i −
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
p1,lj )
2, (9c)
where for each link l and agent i ∈ N l, wˆli is defined as
wˆli =

∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
p1,lj + (a
1,l
i − a2,lφ(i),i) if l ∈ Ci
wlc(k(i),l) − p2,lφ(i),i + p1,li + (a1,li − a2,lφ(i),i) if l /∈ Ci,
(9d)
and, w¯l−i is defined as
w¯l−i =
1
N l(i)
∑
j∈N l(i)
wlj . (9e)
Finally for l /∈ Li, the tax term is defined as
tˆm,li (m
m) =
∑
j∈N (i)
(nli,j − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nlj,h)
2. (9f)
The intuitive explanation of the terms appearing in the tax
function is very similar to the one given above for the UTP
scenario. The additional complication stems from the fact that
we need to keep track of two types of prices, p and w,
corresponding to dual variables µ and λ, respectively.
IV. A CONCRETE EXAMPLE WITH UTP
In this section, we provide a simple but not trivial example
of UTP model and the corresponding mechanism for that.
Assume that we have three agentsN = {1, 2, 3} using a single
link (link 1) with capacity c1 = 1. The valuation function of
agent i ∈ N is given by vi(xi) = i ln(xi). The optimization
problem (1) will be of the form
max
x
ln(x1) + 2 ln(x2) + 3 ln(x3) (10a)
s.t. xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (10b)
and x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1. (10c)
By writing the KKT conditions for this problem, one can
easily calculate the solution to this optimization problem to
be x∗ = ( 16 ,
1
3 ,
1
2 ) and the optimal dual variable is λ = 6. We
will show that the mechanism for UTP, has Nash equilibria,
all of which result in this efficient allocation x∗.
We consider the message network of Figure 4 between the
agents. Note that this message network satisfies Assumption
1 and it is a tree graph. We know that φ(2) = 1 and φ(3) = 1
(they only have one option). Assume that φ(1) = 2. The
above means that agent 1 uses agent 2 for quoting a proxy
of his demand, while agent 2 uses agent 1 and agent 3 uses
agent 1 for the same. The message components of agents are
mu1 = (y1, p
1
1, n
1
1,2, n
1
1,3, q1,2, q1,3), m
u
2 = (y2, p
1
2, n
1
2,1, q2,1)
and mu3 = (y3, p
1
3, n
1
3,1). In this simple, single-link setting,
Fig. 4: Message-exchange network
superscripts 1 are redundant but we maintain them for nota-
tional uniformity with the general description. In this network,
agent 1 can listen to all messages, while agent 2 cannot
listen to m3, and similarly, agent 3 cannot listen to m2. The
allocation functions are as follows
xˆu1(m
u) = ru1y1 xˆ
u
2(m
u) = ru2y2 xˆ
u
3(m
u) = ru3y3,
where
ru1 =
1
q2,1 + y2 + y3
ru2 =
1
y1 + q1,2 + n11,3
ru3 =
1
y1 + n11,2 + q1,3
.
Observe the roles of the q and the n message components. All
agents would have to scale their messages by the total demand
y1 + y2 + y3. We do not want agent 1 to control her scaling
factor and thus we ask agent 2 to quote a proxy q2,1 for her
demand y1. A similar argument for agents 2 and 3 justifies the
presence of the messages q1,2 and q1,3. In addition, agent 2
does not have access to the demand quoted by agent 3 and
that’s why she is using the summary message n11,3 quoted
by agent 1 for this purpose. Similarly for agent 3. Finally,
note that summary messages n12,1 and n
1
3,1 are redundant and
are not used in this example. Since agents 2 and 3 are at
the leafs of the tree they do not need to pass any information
downstream, so these messages are not used in the mechanism.
The tax functions can be written as follows
t1(m
u) = p¯1−1xˆ
u
1
+ (n11,2 − y2)2 + (n11,3 − y3)2 + (q1,2 − y2)2 + (q1,3 − y3)2
+ (p11 − p¯1−1)2 + (p11 − p¯1−1)p¯1−1(1− ru1(q2,1 + y2 + y3))2
t2(m
u) = p¯1−2xˆ
u
2 + (n
1
2,1 − y1 − n11,3)2 + (q2,1 − y1)2
+ (p12 − p¯1−2)2 + (p12 − p¯1−2)p¯1−2(1− ru2(y1 + q1,2 + n11,3))2
t3(m
u) = p¯1−3xˆ
u
3 + (n
1
3,1 − y1 − n11,2)2
+ (p13 − p¯1−3)2 + (p13 − p¯1−3)p¯1−3(1− ru3(y1 + n11,2 + q1,3))2,
where
p¯1−1 =
p12 + p
1
3
2
p¯1−2 = p
1
1 p¯
1
−3 = p
1
1.
Since the n and q messages only appear once in the tax
function of each agent, each agent has the ability to minimize
the tax terms by zeroing out the corresponding quadratic terms
(four terms for agent 1, two terms for agent 2 and one term
for agent 3). So, at NE, we have
n11,2 = y2 n
1
1,3 = y3 n
1
2,1 = y1 + n
1
1,3 n
1
3,1 = y1 + n
1
1,2
q1,2 = y2 q1,3 = y3 q2,1 = y1.
This means that at NE, we have
ru1 = r
u
2 = r
u
3 =
1
y1 + y2 + y3
,
and therefore,
xˆui (m
u) =
yi
y1 + y2 + y3
, i ∈ N .
The above further implies that at NE, xˆu1(m
u) + xˆu2(m
u) +
xˆu3(m
u) = 1 and the link is fully loaded, and as a result, the
last term in all three tax functions will be zero. Consequently,
each agent has now the ability to minimize the tax terms by
zeroing out the remaining quadratic term that depends on the
quoted price. We can conclude that at NE, p11 = p¯
1
−1, p
1
2 =
p¯1−2 = p
1
1, p
1
3 = p¯
1
−3 = p
1
1, which implies that all price
messages are equal (to some yet unspecified price p) at NE,
i.e., p11 = p
1
2 = p
1
3 = p.
Furthermore, by deriving the best response for the messages
y1, y2 and y3 we have the following equation for i ∈ N ,
dui(m
u)
dyi
= 0 if yi > 0
dui(m
u)
dyi
< 0 if yi = 0,
which implies that
v′i(xˆ
u
i ) = p if yi > 0
v′i(xˆ
u
i ) < p if yi = 0.
By solving these equations for xˆui and p, we have p = 6 (it
equals to λ in the optimization problem (10)) and xˆui =
i
6
which means that xˆu1 =
1
6 , xˆ
u
2 =
2
6 and xˆ
u
3 =
3
6 . Hence, the
allocation at NE is efficient. The equilibrium y messages can
be derived from the following equation
yi
y1 + y2 + y3
=
i
6
,
which implies that yi = k i6 for any constant number k > 0.
This shows that there are infinitely many NE, but all of them
have the same and efficient allocation.
V. MECHANISM PROPERTIES
Fact 1: The mechanisms (Mu, xˆu, tˆu) and (Mm, xˆm, tˆm)
are distributed.
This can be obviously derived from the definition of allo-
cation and tax functions. Clearly, they depend only on each
agent’s own messages and the messages of her neighboring
agents.
Theorem 1: (Full Implementation, Individual Rationality
and Weak Budget Balance - UTP) The game Gu has infinitely
many Nash equilibria. At every Nash equilibrium mu ∈ NEu
of the game Gu, the allocation vector xˆu(mu) is efficient, i.e.,
it is equal to the solution, x∗, of problem (1). In addition,
for each agent, individual rationality is satisfied at all NE.
Further, the game Gu is weak budget balanced at all NE, i.e.,∑
i∈N tˆ
u
i (m
u) ≥ 0.
Theorem 2: (Full Implementation, Individual Rationality
and Weak Budget Balance - MMTP) The game Gm has
infinitely many Nash equilibria. At every Nash equilibrium
mm ∈ NEm of the game Gm, the allocation vector xˆm(mm)
is efficient, i.e., it is equal to the solution, x∗, of problem (3).
In addition, for each agent, individual rationality is satisfied
at all NE. Further, the game Gm is weak budget balanced at
all NE, i.e.,
∑
i∈N tˆ
m
i (m
m) ≥ 0.
Regarding the multiplicity of Nash equilibria in the induced
games, we point out that there are two reasons for this
behavior. The first reason of not having a unique Nash equi-
librium is that the dual variables are not generally unique and
therefore, for each dual variable solution (price messages in the
mechanism), we can construct a different Nash equilibrium.
The second reason is that the demand vector in each of the
Nash equilibria is a scaled version of the efficient allocation
and every Nash equilibrium corresponds to a scaled version
of the allocation. However, the resulting allocation in all of
these Nash equilibria is efficient as stated in the theorems.
Since for both problems (1) and (3) the solution is unique,
then, according to Theorems 1 and 2, for all mu ∈ NEu, the
allocation vector xˆu(mu) is unique, and for all mm ∈ NEm,
the allocation vector xˆm(mm) is unique.
Before proving Theorems 1 and 2, some lemmas are pre-
sented that are necessary for their proof. The basic idea behind
the proof is to show, through a series of lemmas, certain
necessary conditions that all NE of the induced games Gu and
Gm should satisfy. These necessary conditions essentially lead
to showing that the allocations and prices at NE are satisfying
the KKT conditions for problems (1) and (4), respectively. The
proof is concluded by showing that indeed there exists such
an equilibrium by constructing it.
Lemma 1: (Concavity) The function uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i) is strictly
concave w.r.t. mui . Similarly, the function uˆ
m
i (m
m
i ,m
m
−i) is
strictly concave w.r.t. mmi .
The strict concavity of uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i) and uˆ
m
i (m
m
i ,m
m
−i) w.r.t.
mui and m
m
i , respectively, helps us calculate the best response
functions for player i in each of the games Gu and Gm by set-
ting the gradient of uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i) w.r.t. m
u
i and uˆ
m
i (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
w.r.t. mmi to be equal to zero, respectively. Whenever an
element of the gradient cannot be set to zero, it is either always
positive or always negative. If any of the elements is always
positive, then as message spaces are unbounded from above,
there is no best response. Otherwise, if any of the elements
of the gradient vector is always negative, the best response
would be zero for that element.
The next two lemmas are related with the quadratic terms
in the tax functions of UTP and MMTP mechanisms. As
mentioned earlier, at NE, agents force these quadratic terms
to zero thus achieving consensus. For instance, each message
component qi,j can be used as a proxy for yj by agent j and
yet is not controlled by agent j. Furthermore, these lemmas
explain how summary messages n are designed to sum up
the demands (UTP) or group demands (MMTP) of all agents
using link l at NE.
Lemma 2: At any m ∈ NEu we have
qi,j = yj , ∀j ∈ Ii, (11a)
and
nli,j = y
l
j +
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nlj,h. (11b)
This implies that at any NE,
nli,j =
∑
h∈N ,n(i,h)=j
ylh. (11c)
Regarding (11c), note that since the message graph is a tree,
each node is connected to any other node only by one path,
and therefore, the demand of each agent is counted once. This
ensures no double counting of demands.
Lemma 3: At any mm ∈ NEm, the following equations hold
for any i ∈ N ,
qi,j = yj , ∀j ∈ Ii (12a)
sli =
qφ(i),i1{qφ(i),i}(z¯
1,l
i )
z¯2,li
, ∀l ∈ Li (12b)
p2,li,j = p
1,l
j , ∀j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj (12c)
wli =
{
wlc(k(i),l) if l ∈ Li, l /∈ Ci
p2,lφ(i),i +
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i p
1,l
j if l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
(12d)
nli,j = y
l
j +
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nlj,h, ∀l ∈ L, j ∈ N (i) (12e)
z1,li = z¯
1,l
i = max{qφ(i),i, max
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
yj}, ∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
(12f)
z2,li = z¯
2,l
i = 1{qφ(i),i}(z¯
1,l
i )
+
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
1{yj}(z¯
1,l
i ), ∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci (12g)
a2,li,j = a
1,l
j , ∀j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj . (12h)
In the next lemma it is shown how radial allocation
(whereby the actual allocation is a scaled version of the
requested allocation by all agents) ensures feasibility at NE.
Lemma 4: (Primal Feasibility) At any mu ∈ NEu, of the
game Gu, the allocation vector xˆu(mu) is feasible for problem
(1). Similarly, at any mm ∈ NEm, of the game Gm, the
allocation vector xˆm(mm) is feasible for problem (3).
The next two lemmas show how different agents form a
consensus on the price variables for each link l. For example
it is shown that all quoted prices pli end up being equal to
a price pl at NE for the UTP scenario. This price will play
the role of the dual variable λl in the KKT conditions (2).
Similarly, for the MMTP scenario, it is shown how different
groups form a consensus on the group prices wˆli for each link
l which becomes equal to wl at NE. Furthermore, in both
lemmas, equilibrium expressions are derived that resemble the
complimentary slackness terms of the KKT conditions in (2)
and (5).
Lemma 5: At any mu ∈ NEu, of the game Gu,
pli = p
l,∀i ∈ N , l ∈ Li. (13a)
Also,
pl(cl −
∑
i∈N l
xˆui ) = 0 ∀l ∈ L. (13b)
Lemma 6: At any mm ∈ NEm, of the game Gm, the
following constraints hold for all i ∈ N and l ∈ Li,
wˆli = w
l (14a)
wl(cl − rmi
∑
i∈N
yli) = 0 (14b)
p1,li (yi − z¯1,li ) = 0. (14c)
The next two lemmas conclude the necessary conditions by
showing that NE implies the stationary conditions in (2) and
(5).
Lemma 7: (Stationarity - UTP) At any mu ∈ NEu, of the
game Gu, the following constraints are satisfied,
v′i(xˆ
u
i (m
u)) =
∑
l∈Li
pl if xˆui (m
u) > 0 (15a)
v′i(xˆ
u
i (m
u)) ≤
∑
l∈Li
pl if xˆui (m
u) = 0. (15b)
Lemma 8: (Stationarity - MMTP) The following constraints
hold at any mm ∈ NEm, of the game Gm,
v′i(xˆ
m
i (m
m)) =
∑
l∈Li
p1,li if xˆ
m
i (m
m) > 0 (16a)
v′i(xˆ
m
i (m
m)) ≤
∑
l∈Li
p1,li if xˆ
m
i (m
m) = 0. (16b)
As mentioned earlier, the overall strategy for proving our
main result is to show that any NE satisfies the KKT con-
ditions of the original problem and then showing that such
an equilibrium indeed exists. This last step is shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 9: (Existence of NE) There exist infinitely many
Nash equilibria mu ∈ NEu, for the game Gu. Also, there
exist infinitely many Nash equilibria mm ∈ NEm, for the
game Gm.
The above series of lemmas is sufficient to prove the full
implementation result for the two mechanisms for UTP and
MMTP. Individual rationality and weak budget balance are
shown separately in the following lemma.
Lemma 10: (Individual Rationality and Weak Budget Bal-
ance) At any NE of the games Gu and Gm, individual
rationality is satisfied
vi(xˆ
u
i (m
u))− tˆui (mu) ≥ vi(0), ∀i ∈ N (17a)
vi(xˆ
m
i (m
m))− tˆmi (mm) ≥ vi(0), ∀i ∈ N . (17b)
Furthermore, both of the mechanisms are weak budget bal-
anced ∑
i∈N
tˆui (m
u) ≥ 0 (18a)∑
i∈N
tˆmi (m
m) ≥ 0. (18b)
We are now ready to state the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 1: In the proof of Lemma 9, we showed
that the message associated to the solution of problem (1),
(x∗, λ∗), is a NE of the game Gu. Now, we want to prove
that all of the NE of the game Gu generate allocation and
prices that are efficient for problem (1). Consider any mu ∈
NEu, if xˆu(mu) is used as the primal variables vector and
p = {p1, ..., pL} is used as the dual variables vector, all of the
KKT conditions (2) are satisfied due to Lemmas 2, 4, 5, and
7. Therefore, xˆu(mu) = x∗ for any mu ∈ NEu and so, full
implementation is obtained. Furthermore, Lemma 10 proves
individual rationality and weak budget balance at any NE of
the game Gu.
The proof of Theorem 2 is very similar to the proof of
Theorem 1 and it is stated below for completeness.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let (x∗, b∗, λ∗, µ∗) be the solution
of problem (4) and consider any mm ∈ NEm. Due to Lemmas
3, 4, 6 and 8, the allocation vector, xˆm(mm) as x∗, rmi z¯
1,l
i as
bl
∗
k(i) (any r
m
j
1z¯lj , j ∈ Glk(i) could work too) and the variables
p1,li and w
l
i (or any w
l
j for j ∈ N l) as µl∗i and λl∗, respectively,
satisfy the KKT conditions (5). Therefore, xˆm(mm) = x∗
for any mm ∈ NEm and hence, the allocation at all NE is
unique and efficient. Also, due to Lemma 9, we know at least
one NE exists and therefore, the mechanism fully implements
problem (3) at its Nash equilibria. Furthermore, Lemma 10
proves individual rationality and weak budget balance.
VI. RELAXING ASSUMPTION 1 ON MESSAGE-EXCHANGE
NETWORK
The primary reason of imposing Assumption 1 is that
there should be a consensus on the prices of different agents
(UTP) or groups (MMTP) using link l at NE and this is not
implementable by the proposed mechanism if the sub-graph
of the agents using link l is not connected.
On the other hand, a message-exchange network that satis-
fies the required properties may be hard or even impossible to
construct. Consider the special case of having only one link
(constraint) in the UTP/MMTP optimization problem. Then,
the message-exchange network should be the tree that contains
all of the agents of the network. But in general there are
more than one links in the UTP/MMTP optimization problem
and the message-exchange network should consist of multiple
connected sub-graphs (each corresponding to one constraint)
and should still be a tree. Constructing such message-exchange
network is hard and may be impossible. In this section, we
propose an alternative extended mechanism so that there is
no need for imposing Assumption 1 on the message-exchange
network.
In the alternative mechanism, we extend the agents that
quote message pli, in UTP, and w
l
i, in MMTP, from the agents
using link l to a bigger group of agents as follows. For
every link l, consider a connected sub-graph GRl = (Nˆ l, E l)
consisting of all agents i ∈ N l in addition to the minimum
number of other agents that do not use link l and are required
to make the sub-graph connected. This connected sub-graph is
called link l’s sub-graph and we know that it exists due to the
connectivity of the message graph. For each agent i, the set of
links l /∈ Li which i ∈ Nˆ l are denoted by Lˆi with |Lˆi| = Lˆi.
The definition of N l(i) is modified as
N l(i) = {j : j ∈ N (i) ∩ Nˆ l}, ∀i ∈ N , l ∈ Li ∪ Lˆi. (19)
In the game Gu, the extended definition of message pi is pi =
(pli, l ∈ Li∪Lˆi), while in the game Gm, the extended definition
of message wi is wi = (wli, l ∈ Li ∪ Lˆi). The tax functions
are also modified for l ∈ Lˆi according to
tˆu,li (m
u) =
∑
j∈N (i)
(nli,j − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nlj,h)
2
+ (pli − p¯l−i)2 + (pli − p¯l−i)p¯l−i(cl − rui fu,li )2
(20)
tˆm,li (m
m) =
∑
j∈N (i)
(nli,j − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nlj,h)
2
+ (wli − w¯l−i)2 + w¯l−i(wli − w¯l−i)(cl − rmi fm,li )2.
(21)
Intuitively, since the sub-graph of agents using each link l
may not be connected, we need other agents i /∈ N l to quote
pli messages in the game G
u and wli messages in the game
Gm. This helps the agents j ∈ N l in forming a consensus on
the prices or group prices of using link l. This is why two
terms have been added to the tax functions above that impose
required conditions for the messages pli and w
l
i in the two
games. In both games, the tax function does not change for
l ∈ Li. For l /∈ Li ∪ Lˆi, the tax function is the same as the
l /∈ Li case for the original mechanism. It is straightforward
to prove almost the same results (with some minor changes
to cover the new messages) for these mechanisms. Therefore,
these mechanisms also fully Nash implement problem (1) and
(3), respectively, and are individually rational and weak budget
balanced at NE.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We proposed two distributed mechanisms for the networks
with UTP and MMTP. As mentioned before, the mechanisms
are applicable to a number of other optimization problems
with linear/max constraints. The proposed mechanisms were
proved to fully Nash implement the solution of problems (1)
(UTP) and (3) (MMTP). The main feature of this work is
that message transmission is done locally via an underlying
message-exchange network, in contrast to the standard mech-
anism design framework that allows message transmission
throughout the whole network.
The dimensionality of agent i’s message in the mechanism
for UTP is Mi = 1 +N(i)L+ |Ii|+Li. Since for each agent
i, the function φ(i) chooses one agent j ∈ N (i), the average
size of the set Ii is 1. Hence, the average dimensionality of an
agent’s message is Ei∈N [Mi] = 2+Ei∈N [N(i)]L+Ei∈N [Li]
and by denoting Ei∈N [N(i)] and Ei∈N [Li] by N¯ and L¯
respectively, the average message dimensionality of the whole
network is
E[
∑
i∈N
Mi] = N(2 + LN¯ + L¯).
Clearly, the dimensionality of message space grows linearly
with N .
The dimensionality of agent i’s message in the mechanism
for MMTP is Mi = 1+4Li+N(i)L+|Ii|+2
∑
j∈Ii Lj+2|Ci|.
Similar to UTP, the average size of the set Ii is 1. Further, the
average value of
∑
j∈Ii Lj is
∑
i∈N Li
N . Also, we know that
for each link l and group k ∈ Kl, there is one agent denoted
by c(k, l) and hence, the average size of |Ci| is
∑
l∈LK
l
N .
Consequently, the average size of the whole network’s message
is
E[
∑
i∈N
Mi] = N(2 + 4L¯+ N¯L+ 2
∑
i∈N Li
N
+ 2
∑
l∈LK
l
N
),
which, similar to UTP, grows linearly with the number of
agents in the network, N .
For the alternative mechanism presented in Section VI,
the term NEi∈N (Lˆi) should be added to the average of
the message dimensionality of the whole network. This is
due to the extra messages that agents have to quote in the
alternative mechanisms to preserve the connectivity of the
message passing.
In terms of message dimensionality, the mechanisms pro-
posed in this paper are more efficient than the distributed
mechanism proposed in [31] which has a message dimension-
ality that grows with N2. This gain in dimensionality may
be a consequence of the fact that the proposed mechanism
in [31] has additional learning guarantees that our proposed
mechanism does not possess.
We would like to emphasize that although the proposed
mechanisms are proven to have efficient Nash equilibria, in
the current work we do not propose any message exchange
algorithm that is guaranteed to converge to these equilibria.
In general, it is not even clear if such algorithm exists. We
have recently proposed one algorithm that is guaranteed to
converge to the NE for our mechanisms with some small
modifications to the model in [43]. However, the study of
more general convergence algorithms is still open and there is
no strategy-proof dynamic algorithm that guarantees conver-
gence. One possible future research direction is redesigning
these mechanisms to possess other features such as learning
guarantees and convergence to NE. Such features would enable
the mechanisms to converge to their NE in a dynamic learning
process over a large set of possible dynamics followed by
the agents [31], [45]. In addition, the study of the tradeoff
between message dimensionality and convergence guarantees
is an interesting open problem.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Since functions uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i) and uˆ
m
i (m
m
i ,m
m
−i) are twice
differentiable w.r.t mui and m
m
i , respectively, we can prove
strict concavity by showing that their Hessian matrices, Hu and
Hm, w.r.t. mui and m
m
i , respectively, are negative definite. The
cross derivatives of uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i) and uˆ
m
i (m
m
i ,m
m
−i) w.r.t. dif-
ferent components of mui and m
m
i , which are the non-diagonal
elements of Hu and Hm, respectively, are zero. Hence, we
consider the diagonal elements and show that they are all
negative. The second partial derivative of uˆui (m
u) w.r.t. all el-
ements of messages ni, qi, pi is equal to −2. Also, the second
partial derivative of uˆmi (m
m) w.r.t. all elements of messages
ni, qi, pi, wi, zi, ai and si is equal to −2. The only message
element left is yi. The second partial derivative of uˆui (m
u)
w.r.t. yi is ∂2uˆui (m
u)/(∂yi)
2 = (rui )
2∂2vi(xˆ
u
i )/(∂xˆ
u
i )
2. Since
vi(xˆ
u
i ) is strictly concave w.r.t. xˆ
u
i , ∂
2uˆui (m
u)/(∂yi)
2 < 0.
Similarly, the second partial derivative of uˆmi (m
m) w.r.t. yi is
∂2uˆmi (m
m)/(∂yi)
2 = (rmi )
2∂2vi(xˆ
m
i )/(∂xˆ
m
i )
2 < 0. Note that
rui and r
m
i don’t consist of any of agent i’s messages and so
they are constant factors.
Therefore, matrices Hu and Hm are negative definite be-
cause all of their diagonal elements are negative and non-
diagonal elements are zero.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
At NE, every agent is best responding to other agents’
messages. Each of the results in this lemma corresponds to
one of agent i’s messages and its best response to other agents
messages. Therefore, all of the results can be directly derived
by setting each of their corresponding element of gradient to
zero. For all i ∈ N we have
∂uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i)
∂qi,j
= 0⇒ qi,j = yj , ∀j ∈ Ii.
Since yj ≥ 0 the above equation can always hold.
∂uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i)
∂nli,j
= 0⇒
nli,j = y
l
j +
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nlj,h ∀j ∈ N (i), l ∈ L. (22)
Using a similar argument as the one used in [32, p. 131] all
above equations can be combined to show that
nli,j =
∑
h∈N ,n(i,h)=j
ylh, (23)
and equivalently, ∑
j∈N (i)
nli,j =
∑
h∈N ,h6=i
ylh.
In order to verify this conclusion, we mention that the mes-
sage graph is a tree, and hence we can form an induction on the
level of nodes from the leaf nodes. If j ∈ N (i) is a leaf node,
there is no message components nlj,h for h ∈ N (j), h 6= i.
because the only neighbor of j is i. As a result, nli,j = y
l
j and
therefore, the induction basis holds. Suppose for all j ∈ N (i),
nlj,h =
∑
k∈N ,n(j,k)=h y
l
k, ∀h ∈ N (j). Substituting this
to (22) we have
nli,j = y
l
j +
∑
h∈N (j)
h6=i
∑
k∈N
n(j,k)=h
ylk ∀j ∈ N (i), l ∈ L. (24)
We need to check whether the set of nodes covered in
the summations above is equal to the set of nodes in the
summation of (23). In (24), we are summing over all nodes
k that can be reached to node j by nodes h ∈ N (j), h 6= i.
Since j ∈ N (i) and there is only one path between any two
nodes in the graph, we conclude that all of these nodes reach
i through j and therefore, n(i, k) = j. This means that the
summations in (23) and (24) include the same set of nodes
and the result is proved.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
According to the explanations at the beginning of the proof
of Lemma 2, by setting each of the corresponding element of
gradients of uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i) to zero for all i ∈ N we have
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂qi,j
= 0⇒ qi,j = yj , ∀j ∈ Ii
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂(sli)
= 0⇒ sli =
qφ(i),i1{qφ(i),i}(z¯
1,l
i )
z¯2,li
, ∀l ∈ Li
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂(p2,li,j)
= 0⇒ p2,li,j = p1,lj , ∀j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂wli
= 0⇒ wli = wlc(k(i),l), ∀l ∈ Li, l /∈ Ci
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂wli
= 0⇒
wli = p
2,l
φ(i),i +
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
p1,lj , ∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂nli,j
= 0⇒ nli,j = ylj +
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nlj,h,
∀j ∈ N (i), l ∈ L.
Using a similar argument as the one used in [32, p. 131] we
prove that
nli,j =
∑
h∈N ,n(i,h)=j
ylh,
and consequently, ∑
j∈N (i)
nli,j =
∑
h∈N ,h6=i
ylh.
The remaining results are related to message elements zi and
2ai.
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂(z1,li )
= 0⇒ z1,li = z¯1,li , ∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂(z2,li )
= 0⇒ z2,li = z¯2,li , ∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂(a2,li,j)
= 0⇒ a2,li,j = a1,lj , ∀j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj .
D. Proof of Lemma 4
According to Lemmas 2 and 3, the following relation holds
at NE,
fu,li =
∑
j∈N
ylj ,
and similarly,
fm,li =
∑
j∈N
ylj .
This implies that all of the agents i ∈ N have the same fu,li
and fm,li and consequently, have the same r
u
i and r
m
i at NE of
the games Gu and Gm, respectively. Further, due to Lemma
3, for the game Gm we can write for every j ∈ Glk
ylj =
{
yj
n maxlk
if l ∈ Lj , yj = maxi∈Glk{yi}
0 oth.,
where n maxlk is the number of agents j ∈ Glk with yj =
maxi∈Glk{yi}. Consequently, ∀l ∈ L we can write∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{xˆmi } =
∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{rmi yi}
≤ c
l∑
j∈N y
l
j
∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{yi} = c
l∑
j∈N y
l
j
∑
i∈N
yli = c
l,
which proves that the allocation xˆm is feasible at NE.
By using similar steps, we can show the feasibility of
allocation of the game Gu at NE.
E. Proof of Lemma 5
In order to prove the first result, we first derive the following
pli = p¯
l
−i ∀i ∈ N , l ∈ Li.
Suppose the above equation does not hold, i.e.,
∃i ∈ N , l ∈ Li : pli 6= p¯l−i.
Then there exists an agent j ∈ N l : plj > p¯l−j (as an example,
we could consider the agent j with the highest plj over all of
the agents and if we have multiple choices, at least one of
them will work). We can show that agent j has a profitable
deviation to pl
′
j = p¯
l
−j = p
l
j − . Indeed, we can write
uˆuj (., p
l′
j )− uˆuj (., plj) = 2 + p¯l−j(cl − ruj fu,lj )2
= ( ︸︷︷︸
>0
+ p¯l−j(c
l − ruj fu,lj )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) > 0,
therefore, we must have pli = p¯
l
−i.
As a result of this equality and because of Assumption 1,
it is obvious that pli = p
l
j , ∀i, j ∈ N l and we denote this
common price by pl.
For the second result, we set the derivative of the utility
function w.r.t. pli to zero,
∂uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i)
∂pli
= 0⇒ 2(pli − p¯l−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0,Due to (13a)
+p¯l−i(c
l − rui fu,li )2 = 0
⇒ pl(cl − rui fu,li )2 = 0⇒ pl(cl −
∑
i∈N l
xˆui ) = 0.
F. Proof of Lemma 6
We first prove result (14a). This result is equivalent with
wˆli = wˆ
l
j , ∀i, j ∈ N l. Assume ∃i, j ∈ N l, wˆli 6= wˆlj . Since
wli = wˆ
l
i at NE and due to Assumption 1, there exists an agent
h ∈ N l for which wˆlh > w¯l−h or equivalently, wˆlh = w¯l−h + 
for some  > 0. We will show that agent h has a profitable
deviation by decreasing his message a1,lh to a
1,l′
h = a
1,l
h − ′ >
0 for some 0 < ′ < . Consequently, wˆl
′
h = wˆ
l
h − ′ =
w¯l−h + − ′ = w¯l−h + ′′. We can write
uˆmh (., a
1,l′
h )− uˆmh (., a1,lh ) =
− ′′2 − w¯l−h′′(cl − rmh fm,lh )2 + 2 + w¯l−h(cl − rmh fm,lh )2
= 2 − ′′2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ w¯l−h(− ′′)(cl − rmh fm,lh )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
> 0,
and we conclude that at any NE, wˆli = wˆ
l
j , ∀l ∈ L, i, j ∈ N l.
Therefore, we can denote this common value for each link l
by wl and we arrive at the result wˆli = w
l, ∀i ∈ N , l ∈ Li.
Now we prove result (14b). Suppose ∃i ∈ N , l ∈ Li so that
wl(cl− rmi
∑
i∈N y
l
i) 6= 0. This implies w¯l−i(cl− rmi fm,li )2 >
0. We show that agent i benefits from deviating to a1,l
′
i =
a1,li −  > 0, for some  > 0. According to the first result of
this lemma, wˆli = w¯
l
−i and we have
uˆmi (., a
1,l′
i )− uˆmi (., a1,li ) = −2 + w¯l−i(cl − rmi fm,li )2
= (−+ w¯l−i(cl − rmi fm,li )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0, Due to assumption
) = (−+ α) > 0, for  < α.
Since α > 0, profitable deviation by a positive  is possible
and the result is proved.
Proving result (14c) is similar to result (14b). Assume
∃i ∈ N , l ∈ Li so that p1,li (yi − z¯1,li ) 6= 0. This implies
that p2,lφ(i),i(z¯
1,l
i − qφ(i),i)2 > 0 and p1,li > 0. We prove agent
i has a profitable deviation to p1,l
′
i = p
1,l
i −  > 0, for some
 > 0. Indeed,
uˆmi (., p
1,l′
i )− uˆmi (., p1,li ) = −2 + p2,lφ(i),i(z¯1,li − qφ(i),i)2
= (−+ p2,lφ(i),i(z¯1,li − qφ(i),i)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0, Due to assumption
) = (−+ α) > 0, for  < α.
Since α > 0, agent i can profit by deviating with a positive 
and the result is proved.
G. Proof of Lemma 7
If xˆui (m
u) > 0, then yi > 0 and hence, the partial derivative
of uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i) w.r.t. yi must be zero at NE. Therefore,
∂uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i)
∂yi
= 0⇒ (∂uˆ
u
i (m
u
i ,m
u
−i)
∂xˆui (m
u)
)
dxˆui (m
u)
dyi
= 0
= (v′i(xˆ
u
i (m
u))−
∑
l∈Li
pl)rui ⇒ v′i(xˆui (mu)) =
∑
l∈Li
pl,
and if xˆui (m
u) = 0, then yi = 0 and therefore, the partial
derivative of uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i) w.r.t. yi must not be positive at
NE. Hence,
∂uˆui (m
u
i ,m
u
−i)
∂yi
≤ 0⇒ (∂uˆ
u
i (m
u
i ,m
u
−i)
∂xˆui (m
u)
)
dxˆui (m
u)
dyi
= (v′i(xˆ
u
i (m
u))−
∑
l∈Li
pl)rui ≤ 0⇒ v′i(xˆui (mu)) ≤
∑
l∈Li
pl.
H. Proof of Lemma 8
Similar to Lemma 7, if xˆmi (m
m) > 0,
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂yi
= 0⇒ (∂uˆ
m
i (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂xˆmi (m
m)
)
dxˆmi (m
m)
dyi
= 0
⇒ (v′i(xˆmi (mm))−
∑
l∈Li
p2,lφ(i),i)r
m
i = 0
⇒ v′i(xˆmi (mm)) =
∑
l∈Li
p1,li .
Note that rmi > 0. If xˆ
m
i (m
m) = 0,
∂uˆmi (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂yi
≤ 0⇒ (∂uˆ
m
i (m
m
i ,m
m
−i)
∂xˆmi (m
m)
)
dxˆmi (m
m)
dyi
≤ 0
⇒ (v′i(xˆmi (mm))−
∑
l∈Li
p2,lφ(i),i)r
m
i ≤ 0
⇒ v′i(xˆmi (mm)) ≤
∑
l∈Li
p1,li .
I. Proof of Lemma 9
To prove the existence of a NE, we show that a suggested
valid message is a NE. For each of the games Gu and Gm,
the suggested message is generated based on the solution
of problems (1) and (3), respectively, which we know exist
and is unique. We notice that because of the monotonicity
of valuation functions, the solution of problems (1) and (3)
always lies in the Pareto optimal region of the feasible set
which, in our case, is the upper boundary of feasible set in
both UTP and MMTP. First consider the game Gu. Suppose
(x∗, λ∗) is the solution of problem (1). We generate mu as
follows. First assume mu satisfies all of the constraints in
Lemma 2. Further, y is set to be any scaled version of x∗ and
since x∗ is on the boundary of feasible region, xˆu(mu) = x∗.
In addition, pli is set to be equal to λ
l∗ and this is valid since
λl∗ ≥ 0. Hence, Lemma 5 is satisfied for mu. Also, due
to stationarity condition, Lemma 7 is also satisfied for mu.
Overall, since Lemmas 2, 5 and 7 are satisfied, we know that
the elements of the gradient vector of agent i’s utility function
w.r.t. mui is either zero (positive messages) or not positive (zero
messages) which implies that each agent is best responding to
other agents’ messages and therefore, mu is a NE of the game
Gu.
Similar steps are taken for the proof of existence of NE
for the game Gm. Let (x∗, b∗, λ∗, µ∗) be the solution of
problem (4). We generate mm as following. First assume
mm satisfies all of the constraints in Lemma 3. Further, y
is set to be any scaled version of x∗ and since x∗ is on
the boundary of feasible region, xˆm(mm) = x∗. In addition,
p1,li is set to be equal to µ
l∗
i and this is valid because
µl∗i ≥ 0. Then, wl =
∑
j∈Glk p
1,l
j =
∑
j∈Glk µ
l∗
j = λ
l∗.
Also rmi z¯
1,l
i = maxj∈Glk(i){r
m
i yj} = maxj∈Gl
k(i)
{xˆmi } =
maxj∈Gl
k(i)
{x∗i } = bl∗k(i). Hence Lemma 6 is satisfied for mm.
Also, due to stationarity condition, Lemma 8 is satisfied for
mm. Overall, since Lemmas 3, 6 and 8 are satisfied, we know
that the elements of the gradient vector of utility function of
each agent i w.r.t. mmi is either zero (positive messages) or
not positive (zero messages) which implies that each agent is
best responding to other agents’ messages and therefore, mm
is a NE.
Notice that the dual variables in the solution of optimization
problems (1) and (4) are not unique, eventhough the primal
solution (x) is unique. For each game and each value of
dual variables there is a suggested message that is a Nash
equilibrium for that game. Further, the y messages at Nash
equilibria of these games have infinitely many options as it
was mentioned in its construction. This means that the Nash
equilibria of these games are not unique and in fact there are
infinitely many Nash equilibria for these games.
J. Proof of Lemma 10
First consider the weak budget balance equations. At NE,
we can write tˆui = xˆ
u
i (m
u)
∑
l∈Li p
l and hence
∑
i∈N tˆ
u
i ≥ 0.
Similarly, tˆmi = xˆ
m
i (m
m)
∑
l∈Li p
1,l
i and hence,
∑
i∈N tˆ
m
i ≥ 0
and both mechanisms are weak budget balanced.
Next, consider the individual rationality part for UTP mech-
anism (the MMTP version is almost identical). For xˆui (m
u) =
0, the result is obvious. For xˆui (m
u) > 0, we define the
function ui as
ui(x) = vi(x)− x
∑
l∈Li
pl.
Since ui(x) is concave w.r.t. x and u′i(xˆ
u
i (m
u)) = 0, then
u′i(y) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ y ≤ xˆui (mu), we can conclude
ui(y) ≥ ui(0) and since ui(0) = vi(0) and ui(xˆui (mu)) =
vi(xˆ
u
i (m
u))− tˆui (mu), it follows that vi(xˆui (mu))− tˆui (mu) ≥
vi(0) and the result is proved.
